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ABSTRACT The paper deals with our ability to classify objects as being of a
certain kind on the basis of information provided by the senses (empirical classi-
fication) and to ascribe empirical predicates to objects on the basis of these
classificatory verdicts (empirical predication). I consider, first, the project of con-
struing the episodes in which this ability is exercised as involving universals. I
argue that this construal faces epistemological problems concerning our access
to the universals that it invokes. I present the empiricist strategy for dealing with
these problems by appeal to sensory qualities, and argue that it rests on a mis-
take. Then I turn to sketching an account of our faculty of empirical classifi-
cation and predication which doesn’t invoke universals. The account takes as its
starting point the nominalist construal of sense experience to be found in the
work of C. I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman. I argue that this construal has the
resources for explaining some of the central features of the practice of empirical
predication.
There are those who feel that our ability to understand general terms ...
would be inexplicable unless there were universals as objects of apprehen-
sion. And there are those who fail to detect, in such appeal to a realm of
entities over and above the concrete objects in space and time, any
explanatory value.
W. V. O. Quine, ‘Logic and the Reification of Universals’
I
Classification, Predication and Uniûersals. One of our basiccognitive tools is the ability to classify objects as being of a
certain kind on the basis of information provided by sense experi-
ence. I exercise this ability, e.g., when I classify a table-top as
square by looking at it, when I classify a wine as chardonnay by
tasting it, or when I classify a substance as an acid by looking at
the litmus paper that I have soaked in it. I shall refer to the
episodes in which this ability is exercised as acts of empirical
classification. This ability has a linguistic correlate in the ascrip-
tion of empirical predicates. I can decide on the basis of sense
experience whether to ascribe to an object terms such as ‘square’,
*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London,
on Monday, 23rd October, 2000 at 4.15 p.m.
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‘chardonnay’ or ‘acid’, in episodes to which I shall refer as acts
of empirical predication.
Acts of empirical classification and predication represent
objects as being a certain way. But they wouldn’t have this rep-
resentational power unless it made sense to speak of them as
correct or incorrect. For the notion of representation presup-
poses a contrast between how things are and how they are rep-
resented as being. Hence, barring borderline cases, I will be either
right or wrong in classifying a table-top as square, or in ascribing
the term ‘acid’ to a substance.
This feature of acts of empirical classification and predication
is often explained in terms of universals. The appeal to universals
in this context is motivated by the idea that a universal is sup-
posed to effect a classification of objects in a certain range that
is objective, i.e. independent of our classificatory verdicts. The
property of being square is instantiated by some objects and not
by others, and whether the table-top I’m looking at instantiates
this property is in principle independent of how I feel inclined to
classify it. These considerations suggest that we might be able to
explain what makes acts of empirical classification right or wrong
if we construed them as involving universals. On this account,
when I classify an object as being of a certain kind, I claim that
it instantiates a universal. Then the act of empirical classification
will be right or wrong according to whether the object
instantiates, as a matter of fact, this universal. Similarly, when I
ascribe an empirical predicate to an object, I claim that the object
instantiates a universal that is associated with the predicate in
such a way as to determine its satisfaction conditions. And my
ascription of the predicate will be right or wrong according to
whether the object instantiates this universal.1 I shall refer to this
account as the platonist account of empirical classification and
predication.2
The platonist account involves a clear commitment to the
existence of the realm of universals in terms of which it construes
1. Mark Wilson claims to find a position along these lines in the works of Frege and
Russell; ‘Predicate Meets Property’, Philosophical Reûiew, 91 (1982), p. 555.
2. I am using the label in a wider sense than is customary in the literature on univer-
sals. Here it is meant to apply to any position that construes empirical classification
and predication in terms of universals, whether these are thought of as inhabiting a
separate realm, as inherent in particulars, or as purely mental entities.
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empirical classification and predication. Furthermore, it presup-
poses that we can establish contact with this realm. Contact has
to be established at two levels. On the one hand, I have to be
able to single out the universal of which I am claiming the object
to be an instance. On the other hand, I have to be able to deter-
mine, on the basis of sense experience, whether the object I’m
classifying is, as a matter of fact, an instance of this universal.
The same requirements apply to empirical predication. On the
one hand, I have to be able to single out the universal that will
determine the satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate.
On the other hand, I have to be able to determine, on the basis
of sense experience, whether this universal is instantiated by the
candidate object of predication.3
II
Awareness of Uniûersals. The platonist account has been tra-
ditionally associated with the view that both kinds of contact
with universals are established in conscious episodes. According
to this view, I can gain conscious access to a universal and decide
to classify an object as instantiating or failing to instantiate it,
and then draw on my awareness of the universal in order to
determine whether my sense experience provides evidence for or
against its instantiation by the object. The same goes for empiri-
cal predication. On this account, I can single out a universal as
an object of awareness and decide that an empirical predicate, as
I mean it, will be satisfied by the objects which instantiate it.
Then, when I want to determine whether I should apply the
predicate to an object, I can bring this universal to mind in order
to determine whether my sensory input supports the ascription
of the predicate or the decision not to ascribe it.
This account of how we establish contact with universals raises
the question of how a conscious episode could have this kind
of power. The question can be made pressing with two parallel
applications of a familiar line of sceptical reasoning. Consider
first the episodes in which we see ourselves as singling out the
universal involved in an act of empirical classification by focusing
3. The claim that the subject has to be able to establish these kinds of contact with
universals is not meant to exclude positions which explain these connections in terms
of factors that are external to the subject.
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our attention on it. If challenged to support our belief that these
episodes actually succeed in bringing a universal to conscious-
ness, we would probably have to adduce their phenomenological
character—our impression that they feel like the apprehension
of universals. But this justification rests on the claim that epi-
sodes with the phenomenological features that we have adduced
(normally) succeed in bringing universals to consciousness. The
sceptic would challenge us to justify this claim, and we don’t
seem to be in a position to meet the challenge. We would be able
to justify this claim if we had an independent way of determining
that a conscious episode has established the right sort of connec-
tion with a universal. But, on the account that the sceptic is
attacking, the only way I can support the claim that a universal
has actually been singled out by a conscious episode is with
another conscious episode of this kind—with another application
of the ability that the sceptic is calling into question.
The same goes for episodes in which I see myself as drawing
on my awareness of a universal in order to determine whether
my sensory input supports the claim that it is instantiated by an
object. Even if we assume that in these episodes I gain conscious
access to universals, it remains to be seen whether they generate
the right inclinations concerning their instantiation conditions.
We would be able to establish the correctness of these incli-
nations if we had independent access to the instantiation con-
ditions of the universals that these episodes single out. But once
again, the only procedure at our disposal for determining
whether a universal is instantiated by an object is the kind of
conscious episode whose credentials are being questioned by the
sceptic.
These lines of reasoning would undermine, if successful, the
claim that we establish in conscious episodes the connections
with the realm of universals that the platonist account of empiri-
cal classification calls for. According to the first, we would not
be entitled to treat conscious episodes as singling out the univer-
sal that I claim to be instantiated by an object in an act of empiri-
cal classification. The conscious episodes to which we ascribe this
power may systematically fail to single out a universal as playing
this role in each case. According to the second, we would not be
entitled to treat the conscious episodes in which we take ourselves
to gain access to a universal, in order to determine whether an
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object instantiates it, as generating reliable verdicts on its
instantiation conditions. Even if these episodes succeeded in
bringing a universal to consciousness, they might generate sys-
tematically wrong inclinations concerning its instantiation
conditions.
Similar sceptical outcomes would ensue for the platonist
account of empirical predication. The first line of reasoning
would urge us to accept that we are not entitled to claim that a
conscious episode can single out a universal for the job of
determining the satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate.
The conscious episodes in which we see ourselves as performing
this task may systematically fail to link predicates with univer-
sals. According to the second line of reasoning, we are not
entitled to expect that our conscious access to the universal that
determines the satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate
will tend to generate correct inclinations as to which objects to
ascribe it to. Awareness of the universal that plays this role may
generate systematically incorrect verdicts on the satisfaction con-
ditions of the predicate.
Moreover, in the case of predication a third kind of sceptical
worry can be generated. It concerns the reidentification of the
universal that the speaker has singled out as determining the sat-
isfaction conditions of a predicate. When he subsequently tries
to gain conscious access to it again in order to decide on the
ascription of the predicate, he may bring to consciousness a dif-
ferent universal. And once again the sceptic would argue that we
are not justified in thinking that such misidentifications don’t
occur all the time.
III
Platonist Empiricism. A central component of traditional empiri-
cist thought can be seen as an attempt to save the platonist
account of empirical classification and predication from these
difficulties. It is the claim that Sellars characterised as ‘the idea
that awareness of certain sorts—and by ‘‘sorts’’ I have in mind,
in the first instance, determinate sense repeatables—is a primor-
dial, non-problematic feature of ‘‘immediate experience’’ ’.4
4. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M.
Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. I: The Foundations
of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 286.
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Locke, Berkeley and Hume, Sellars tells us, ‘take for granted that
the human mind has an innate ability to be aware of certain
determinate sorts—indeed, that we are aware of them simply by
ûirtue of haûing sensations and images’.5 According to the assump-
tion that Sellars identifies in these passages, there is a class of
universals to which we enjoy unproblematic access. These are
universals instantiated, not by the physical objects of which we
have sensory experience, but by our sensory experience itself—
not by the table-top I’m looking at, but by the visual impressions
that I receive when I look at it; not by the wine I’m drinking,
but by the gustatory impressions that I receive when I taste it. I
shall refer to these universals as sensory qualities.6
The empiricist assumption can be brought to bear on the diffi-
culties faced by the platonist account. For the assumption can
be construed as the claim that my awareness of sensory qualities
does not face the problems that the sceptic has raised for my
conscious access to the universals involved in acts of empirical
classification. When I have the phenomenology of focusing my
attention on the kind of universal that is instantiated in the physi-
cal world, I may fail to single out a universal as the object of my
awareness. But when I have the phenomenology of focusing my
attention on a sensory quality, there’s bound to be a sensory
quality on which my attention is focused. Similarly, awareness of
a physical universal may generate the inclination to classify as
an instance of it an object which as a matter of fact doesn’t
instantiate it. But awareness of a sensory quality always gener-
ates the right inclinations on its instantiation by my sensory
input. If I feel inclined to treat a sensory episode as instantiating
a sensory quality of which I am aware, my sensory input is
guaranteed to instantiate the sensory quality.
Thus, according to the empiricist thought, sensory qualities
would provide us with an unproblematic point of entry into the
realm of universals, and we could try to use them to save the
platonist account of empirical classification from the sceptical
worries outlined above. The idea would be to construe the epi-
sodes in which we take ourselves to gain conscious access to a
5. Ibid., p. 288.
6. The empiricist assumption that Sellars identifies only treats as unproblematically
accessible determinate sensory qualities. In what follows I shall ignore this restriction,
as nothing will turn on which sensory qualities are treated in this way.
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universal as involving sensory qualities. They would act as inter-
mediaries between our inclinations and the physical universals in
terms of which the platonist construes empirical classification.
Thus when I see myself as focusing my attention on a physical
universal, my immediate object of awareness would be a collec-
tion of sensory qualities. A physical universal would then be
singled out as the bearer of a certain relation to the sensory qual-
ities of which I am unproblematically aware. Similarly, when I
want to determine whether a physical universal is instantiated
by an object, I would determine, in the first instance, whether a
collection of sensory qualities is instantiated by my sensory input.
This would enable me to determine whether the physical univer-
sal is instantiated by the physical object by virtue of the connec-
tion between the physical universal and the sensory qualities, and
between the physical object and my sensory input.
Parallel adjustments could be made to the platonist construal
of empirical predication. The conscious episode in which I take
myself to pair an empirical predicate with the universal that
determines its satisfaction conditions would pair the predicate,
in the first instance, with a collection of sensory qualities. Then
the physical universal that bears a certain relation to these sen-
sory qualities would be singled out for the job of determining
the satisfaction conditions of the predicate. And in the conscious
episodes in which I decide whether to ascribe an empirical predi-
cate to a physical object, I would draw on my awareness of the
sensory qualities that I have paired with the predicate in order
to determine whether they are instantiated by my sensory input.
This would enable me to determine whether the physical object
satisfies the empirical predicate by virtue of the connections
between the sensory qualities that I have paired with the predi-
cate and the physical universal that determines its satisfaction
conditions, and between my sensory input and the physical object
of predication.
We can see that this strategy for saving the platonist account
from sceptical worries rests on two major assumptions. The first
is the assumption identified by Sellars to the effect that our con-
scious access to sensory qualities is unproblematic. The second
is the claim that the physical universals that figure in our acts of
empirical classification can be singled out as the bearers of a
certain relation to the sensory qualities that guide our classifi-
catory verdicts. In terms of predication, the second assumption
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translates into the claim that the universal that determines the
satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate can be singled
out as the bearer of a certain relation to the sensory qualities
that we pair with the predicate when we ascribe meaning to it.
Empiricists in the first half of the twentieth century devoted a
good deal of effort to vindicating the second of these assump-
tions. Some tried to connect physical universals with sensory
qualities by means of logical links—by treating the universal that
determines the satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate
as a ‘logical construct’ from the sensory qualities that speakers
associate with it. Others appealed instead to nomic connections
between both kinds of universal. Many philosophers nowadays
take a dim view of the prospects of these programmes. In any
case, their success would be largely pointless unless the first
assumption on which the strategy rests could also be vindicated,
i.e. unless we were entitled to treat awareness of sensory qualities
as unproblematic. For Sellars, this was far from being the case.
He saw this assumption as a fundamental mistake—a version of
what he characterised as the myth of the given.
The inadequacy of the empiricist assumption becomes obvious
as soon as we consider why awareness of sensory qualities is sup-
posed to be less problematic than awareness of physical univer-
sals. The idea behind the assumption is that our proximity to the
objects that inhabit our own minds, and to the universals that
they instantiate, rules out the possibility of the kinds of mistake
that could arise once we move out of the mental realm into the
physical world. Our access to particulars and universals in the
physical world is subject to all sorts of distorting influences that
might lead us astray. But concerning sensory particulars and uni-
versals, the thought goes, the possibility of error simply doesn’t
arise. The mind is just too close to its own objects to be system-
atically mistaken in its verdicts about them.
In other words, the difficulties that we face in trying to gain
conscious access to physical universals are diagnosed as arising
from the fact that they are physical—inhabiting a world beyond
the ‘walled garden’ in which conscious episodes take place. If this
diagnosis were correct, the problems would not arise so long as
we stayed within the bounds of this inner theatre. But the diag-
nosis is not correct. The problems that we face when we try to
gain conscious access to physical universals do not stem from the
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fact that they are physical, but from the fact that they are univer-
sals. A universal effects a classification of particulars that is
objective—independent in principle of our classificatory verdicts.
This independence from our inclinations is the only fact that the
sceptic needs to invoke in order to drive a wedge between the
realm of universals and the conscious episodes in which we see
ourselves as gaining access to them. Hence retreating to the men-
tal realm fails to protect our verdicts from the real source of
trouble. For the classification of mental objects that a sensory
quality effects is no less independent of our inclinations than the
classification of physical objects effected by a physical universal.
What is supposed to render the former unproblematically access-
ible is not a lack of objectivity, but our proximity to them. As a
contemporary advocate of the empiricist view puts it, ‘The near-
infallibility of certain judgements about one’s own experience is
not a matter of the judgement establishing the reality, but of the
lack of room for error in judgement, given the kind of reality we
are talking about, namely, one with which one is directly
acquainted.’ 7 But the objective character of sensory qualities
entails that our apprehension of them is, at least in principle,
subject to error. This point was appreciated by some of the lead-
ing advocates of the empiricist position in the first half of the
twentieth century. Thus C. D. Broad writes:
I do not ... see any reason to suppose that even judgements of pure
acquaintance are theoretically infallible. ... All judgements involve
universals among their terms, whether they be about sense-data
with which we are acquainted or about anything else. And it seems
always possible to be mistaken in thinking that such and such a
term is an instance of such and such a quality or that such and
such a complex is characterised by such and such a relation.8
And once the theoretical possibility of mistakes is accepted, we
cannot legitimately assume that sensory qualities are unproblem-
atically accessible in conscious episodes, until we have established
their agreement with the facts about sensory qualities that they
purport to track. But since we can only perform this task by
means of other conscious episodes of the same kind, we face with
7. Howard Robinson, Perception (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 104.
8. C. D. Broad, ‘Is There ‘‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’’?’, Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 2 (1919), pp. 219–220.
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respect to our access to sensory qualities the very same situation
that enabled the sceptic to call our conscious access to physical
universals into question. This consequence didn’t go unnoticed
either by some of the leading representatives of the empiricist
movement. Thus, according to C. I. Lewis, ‘If a sensum has a
character which ... can be wrongly apprehended or ‘‘not not-
iced’’, then a large part of the problem of knowledge concerns
our ûeridical apprehension of sensa; the supposition that they
simply are in mind or identical with the content of awareness is
incompatible with the possibility of erroneous judgement of their
... objective character.’ 9 Or, as Nelson Goodman puts it, if the
conscious episodes in which we take ourselves to gain access to
sensory qualities can generate incorrect verdicts, ‘What Guardian
Angel or vestige of Original Virtue keeps us from such
mistakes?’10 In sum, once the sceptic is allowed to open a gap
between physical universals and the conscious episodes in which
we see ourselves as gaining access to them, sensory qualities can-
not be called upon to solve the problem.
Needless to say, these considerations don’t amount to a full
defence of the sceptic’s reasoning. Other strategies might be
available for vindicating our conscious access to universals in the
face of sceptical challenges. Furthermore, even if the sceptic’s
conclusions were allowed to stand, we might not be forced to
abandon the platonist account—provided that we were prepared
to give up the idea that our access to the universals that figure
in acts of empirical classification takes place in conscious
episodes.11 I shall not try to assess the prospects of any of these
strategies for solving the epistemological difficulties faced by the
platonist account. I want to consider instead the situation in
which we would find ourselves if none of these strategies suc-
ceeded—if we had no viable account of our access to the univer-
sals that figure in the platonist construal of acts of empirical
9. C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (New
York: Dover, 1956), pp. 126–127, fn.
10. Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1966), p. 98.
11. This is the route taken by those who attempt to explain predicate satisfaction
in information-theoretic terms. According to the information-theoretic model, the
property that determines the satisfaction conditions of a predicate is singled out by
the nomic connections between sensory presentations of instances of the property
and a certain differential response on the part of the speaker, e.g., ascription of the
predicate to the presented object. These nomic connections can also be invoked in a
reliabilist account of the justification of the speaker’s ascription verdicts.
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classification and predication. One natural reaction to this pre-
dicament would be to abandon the platonist account, and to
attempt a construal of these episodes which doesn’t invoke uni-
versals. In the remainder of this paper I am going to explore the
possibility of construing empirical classification and predication
along these lines.
IV
The Giûen without Myths.12 The kind of position that I am going
to explore enjoys little currency these days. As we are about to
see, it had some prominent advocates among empiricist philos-
ophers early in the twentieth century, but the fact that their views
have this character is often overlooked. We tend to think of all
proponents of the doctrine of the empirically given as making
the mistake denounced by Sellars, even though some of them
were among the first to see that trying to save our conscious
access to universals by recourse to sensory qualities was an
utterly misguided project.
C. I. Lewis was one of them. In Mind and the World Order, he
accuses those who characterise the given element in experience
in terms of the apprehension of universals in our sensory input
of failing ‘to go deep enough and to distinguish what is really
given from what is imported by interpretation’.13 Their mistake
lies in failing to notice that ‘there is interpretation in calling the
sensum ‘‘elliptical’’ as much as in calling the penny ‘‘round’’ ’.14
Lewis’s own characterisation of the given invokes the notion
of qualia. Qualia are ‘recognisable qualitative characters ...,
which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a
sort of universals’.15 Obviously, the analogy between qualia and
universals cannot be perfect. Otherwise, in characterising the
given in terms of the apprehension of qualia, Lewis would be
making the same mistake as those that he accuses of not going
deep enough. He is aware of this, and indeed he diagnoses the
12. This section expands on the discussion in §1 of my ‘Predicates, Properties and
the Goal of a Theory of Reference’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 51 (1996), pp.
121–161.
13. Mind and the World Order, p. 62.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 121.
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mistake of his opponents as arising from the ‘confusion of the
logical universal with given qualia of sense’.16
‘Qualia’, he writes, ‘are universals, in the sense of being recog-
nised from one to another experience’.17 However, ‘The qualia
of sense ..., though repeatable in experience and intrinsically
recognizable, ... are fundamentally different from the ‘‘univer-
sals’’ of logic and of traditional problems concerning these.’18
How do qualia then differ from universals? ‘The quale’, Lewis
writes, ‘is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any
possible error because it is purely subjective. The property of an
object is objective; the ascription of it is a judgement which may
be mistaken.’19 Thus while judgements that ascribe properties can
be mistaken, in the apprehension of qualia no mistake is possible.
Hence the apprehension of qualia seems to have the status
ascribed to awareness of sensory qualities by those who tried to
save the platonist account by invoking them. Isn’t the infallibility
of the former as mythical as that of the latter? The reason why
mistakes can be made in the ascription of properties, but not in
the apprehension of qualia, Lewis tells us, is that properties are
objectiûe, but qualia are subjectiûe. Notice however that the con-
trast cannot be between features of physical objects and features
of mental objects. Remember his remark that there is as much
interpretation in calling the sensum ‘elliptical’ as in calling the
penny ‘round’. ‘Subjective’ is not to be understood as ‘mental’,
for ‘what is not a ‘‘thing’’ or objective, in terms of our knowledge
of the physical, may be something objective in the categories of
psychology’.20 This would be so if ‘psychological states are events
which modify a substantive thing, the mind’.21 Indeed, he points
out that ‘we needn’t say that what is given is a ‘‘mental state’’ or
even ‘‘in the mind’’ in any more explicit sense than is itself
implied in [its] givenness’.22 Mental objects and events, on this
16. Ibid., p. 60.
17. Ibid., p. 121.
18. Ibid., p. 61.
19. Ibid., p. 121.
20. Ibid., p. 127.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 65. The term ‘subjective’ doesn’t seem much more satisfactory as a
characterisation of the given. Cf. p. 63: ‘a distinction between the subjective and the
objective ... is irrelevant to giûenness as such’, and p. 46: ‘In immediacy, there is no
separation of subject and object’.
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objective construal of the mental, would be ‘a new kind of Ding
an sich, which is none the better for being inappropriately named
so as to suggest its phenomenological character’.23 Their features
are not the kind of thing that we can infallibly apprehend, and
hence they are not to be identified with qualia.
We get a hint of the real reason why the apprehension of
qualia is infallible when Lewis writes: ‘Apprehension of the pre-
sented quale ... is not knowledge in any sense in which ‘‘knowl-
edge’’ connotes the opposite of error’.24 The suggestion is that the
apprehension of qualia is not to be looked upon as a cognitive
enterprise, whose success or otherwise will depend on how things
stand with the qualia that I purport to apprehend. The alterna-
tive account of the character of qualia apprehension that seems
to be suggested by Lewis’s remarks is made explicit by Nelson
Goodman, when he is developing Lewis’s notion. ‘If I say’,
Goodman writes, ‘that the green presented by the grass now is
the same as the green presented by it at a certain past moment,
... my statement might ... be looked upon as a decree’.25 On this
account, the reason why our verdicts on the presence of qualia
are infallible is not that we are miraculously good at avoiding
mistakes, or that we are just too close to them for mistakes ever
to arise. The reason is that facts about qualia are constituted by
the verdicts that we feel inclined to emit. Their existence, identity
and instantiation conditions are determined, on this account, by
the verdicts that arise from our classificatory inclinations.
Notice that construing qualia in these terms doesn’t make
them in any sense arbitrary. For, as Goodman indicates, ‘I am
not equally inclined to identify the color presented by the grass
now with the color presented by the sky an hour ago.’ 26 I am
not free to choose which verdicts on the presence of qualia I feel
inclined to emit. Hence my classificatory inclinations, and the
qualia that we can define in terms of them, appear to satisfy
Lewis’s definitive criterion of what is given—‘that the mode of
thought can neither create nor alter it’.27
23. Ibid., p. 65.
24. Ibid., p. 125.
25. The Structure of Appearance, p. 98.
26. Ibid.
27. Mind and the World Order, p. 66.
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Notice, also, that this account doesn’t render our verdicts on
the presence of qualia irrevisable. As Goodman points out, ‘A
decree, however safe it may be from disproof, is vulnerable to
cancellation by another decree.’ 28 This revision may come about
‘because of a new impulse of the same sort that led to the original
decision’.29 Revision may also be prompted by the consequences
of a decree, since ‘our decrees can lead us into such serious trou-
ble as outright inconsistency’.30
V
Nominalist Empiricism. The importance for our purposes of the
Lewis–Goodman notion of quale lies in the possibility of using
it as a central ingredient of an account of empirical classification
and predication in which universals are not involved. I shall use
for this account the label nominalist empiricism. I shall focus on
predication, for which the nominalist empiricist account can be
more easily presented. Like the empiricist version of the platonist
account that we have considered above, nominalist empiricism
construes empirical predication as taking place in conscious epi-
sodes. But instead of construing these episodes as awareness of
sensory qualities, it construes them as instances of quale appre-
hension. The resulting construal of the conscious episodes
involved in empirical predication is structurally very similar to
the platonist empiricist construal. But underlying this structural
similarity there is a fundamental difference, arising from the con-
trast between sensory qualities and qualia highlighted in the
previous section.
Let’s consider the contrast in some detail by looking at a para-
digmatic case of the understanding and subsequent use of an
empirical predicate. Suppose that someone is teaching me how
to decide on the ascription of the term ‘chardonnay’ to a wine
by tasting it. He would give me different wines to taste, indicating
in each case whether the wine satisfies the predicate. Suppose
that, after a few samples, I feel that I have identified the taste
associated with the predicate, and decide to ascribe it to those
wines that strike me as having that taste.
28. The Structure of Appearance, p. 98.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
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For the platonist empiricist, in this conscious episode I have
become aware of a gustatory quality, and decided to ascribe the
predicate to a wine that I taste whenever I detect this quality
in the resulting gustatory input. The nominalist empiricist, by
contrast, would describe this episode as the apprehension of a
quale and the decision to apply the predicate to a wine whenever
I find this quale present in my gustatory input. The difference
between the two construals has important consequences. As we
saw above, even if this episode exhibits the phenomenological
features that I associate with awareness of a sensory quality, I
may be wrong in ascribing this character to it. For in spite of
how it feels, this episode may have failed to single out a sensory
quality as an object of awareness. For the nominalist empiricist,
by contrast, the possibility of this kind of error doesn’t arise. The
fact that it seems to me that I have identified a taste that I can
go on to recognize in subsequent perceptual episodes makes it
the case that I have apprehended a quale. This is not, as in the
mythical version of the doctrine of the given, to ascribe to this
episode a power to establish contact with an independent reality.
It is simply a direct consequence of the way in which the notion
of quale has been construed.
Consider now the conscious episodes in which I decide whether
to ascribe the predicate to the wines that I go on to taste. Accord-
ing to the platonist empiricist, in these episodes I bring to con-
sciousness again the sensory quality that I have paired with the
predicate, in order to determine whether it is instantiated by my
gustatory input when I taste a wine. For the nominalist empiri-
cist, in these episodes I focus my attention again on the quale that
I have paired with the predicate, and decide whether it strikes me
as being present in my gustatory input. Once again substituting
qualia for sensory qualities has important consequences. If these
episodes are construed as giving me conscious access to a sensory
quality, two further kinds of mistake are possible, even if we
assume that I have succeeded in singling out a sensory quality as
an object of awareness. First, contrary to what I think, I may
have brought to consciousness the wrong sensory quality—i.e.
not the one that I had originally paired with the predicate.
Second, even if I have focused on the right sensory quality,
awareness of it may generate incorrect inclinations concerning its
presence in my sensory input. I may feel inclined to find it present
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in sensory episodes from which it is absent, or absent from sen-
sory episodes in which it is present. Neither of these kinds of
mistake is possible in the nominalist empiricist construal of these
episodes. If the wine that I’m now tasting strikes me as having
the taste that I had identified in a wine that I tasted in the past,
that’s all it takes for the quale that I’m now apprehending to be
identical to the quale that I had apprehended on the earlier
occasion. And that’s also all it takes for this quale to be present
in my gustatory input. Once again, this infallibility is not a sub-
stantive achievement on my part, but a straightforward conse-
quence of the way qualia have been construed.
What we have then is an account of the conscious episodes
involved in the understanding and ascription of an empirical
predicate in which universals are not involved. The conscious
episode in which a speaker comes to understand an empirical
predicate is construed as his pairing with the predicate a quale,
or a collection of qualia, that he has apprehended, and undertak-
ing to ascribe the predicate whenever it strikes him as present in
his sensory input. And the subsequent conscious episodes in
which he decides on the ascription of the predicate are construed
as his reidentifying this quale or collection of qualia in his sen-
sory input. Let me refer to the quale or collection of qualia that
plays this role for an empirical predicate (for a speaker) as its
empirical base (for that speaker).
A crucial feature of this construal is that it pre-empts the scep-
tical challenges that the platonist construal of these episodes
gives rise to. The sceptic cannot drive a wedge between qualia
and the episodes in which they are apprehended because the
existence, identity and instantiation conditions of qualia are con-
stituted by the inclinations that these episodes generate.
VI
The Practice of Empirical Predication. The construal of the con-
scious episodes involved in empirical predication that I have
sketched in the previous section is only the starting point of the
nominalist programme. The possibility of characterising these
episodes without invoking universals wouldn’t be of much sig-
nificance unless this characterisation could sustain a satisfactory
account of the practice of empirical predication. On the face of
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it, the nominalist will find this task much harder than the platon-
ist. The infallibility of qualia apprehension may be an important
asset when trying to counter sceptical challenges. But for the task
of accounting for the practice of empirical predication, it seems
to be a serious liability. The reason is that the practice seems
to acknowledge the possibility of mistakes concerning predicate
satisfaction parallel to the kinds of mistake that we can make
when we try to gain conscious access to universals. First, the
practice treats ascription verdicts as revisable. I may feel inclined
to ascribe an empirical predicate to an object which as a matter
of fact fails to satisfy it, or, vice versa, I may feel inclined not to
ascribe it to an object which satisfies it. Second, the practice
seems to make room for the possibility that a speaker inadver-
tently changes the satisfaction conditions that his understanding
assigns to an empirical predicate. Third, the practice seems to
acknowledge the possibility that a speaker is wrong in thinking
that he has succeeded in assigning satisfaction conditions to an
empirical predicate.
Explaining these features of the practice would be completely
straightforward if we construed our verdicts on the ascription of
empirical predicates as arising from awareness of universals. My
ascriptions of an empirical predicate could be wrong because my
awareness of the universal that determines its satisfaction con-
ditions may result in the wrong inclinations concerning the
instantiation conditions of the universal. I may inadvertently
change the satisfaction conditions of an empirical predicate
because I may come to base my ascriptions of the predicate on
my awareness of a universal other than the one that I had orig-
inally paired with it. And I may be wrong in thinking that my
understanding of an empirical predicate assigns satisfaction con-
ditions to it because I may fail to bring a universal to conscious-
ness in the episode in which I see myself as performing this task.31
Obviously, none of these explanations is available to the
nominalist, since speakers are infallible concerning the instanti-
ation, identity and existence of the qualia that they pair with an
empirical predicate when they understand it. In this section, I am
31. In the empiricist version of the platonist account, mistakes could be explained
not only in terms of the fallibility of our awareness of sensory qualities, but also by
appeal to the connection between these and the universals that determine the satisfac-
tion conditions of empirical predicates.
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going to consider how the nominalist could go about explaining
these features of the practice.
Let’s start with the revisability of our verdicts on the ascription
of empirical predicates. We have seen that the infallibility of our
verdicts on the presence of qualia leaves room for a certain meas-
ure of revisability. I could, e.g., change my mind on the presence
of the quale that I have associated with ‘chardonnay’ in my present
gustatory experience. But we take the revisability of our verdicts
on the ascription of empirical predicates to go further than this.
We often revise verdicts on the ascription of an empirical predi-
cate without changing our verdicts concerning its empirical base.
If our ascription verdicts were based on qualia apprehension, one
could argue, we wouldn’t treat them in this way.
Let’s focus on a specific example of the kind of situation that
may raise a problem for the nominalist. When speakers first come
to understand the term ‘gold’, they typically acquire procedures
for deciding on its ascription that are based on the presence in
objects of certain observable features. Consider Jane, who has
learnt to ascribe the predicate to objects with the features corre-
sponding to her predicates ‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’. Jane will ascribe
‘gold’ to any object she comes across to which she feels inclined
to ascribe ‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’. Nevertheless, in some circum-
stances, she might come to revise these verdicts. She could come
to the conclusion that she was wrong in ascribing ‘gold’ to
objects to which she was right in ascribing ‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’.
The nominalist would seem to have trouble accommodating
this possibility. He will have to construe Jane’s understanding of
‘gold’ as arising from an episode in which she assigns to it an
empirical base consisting of the qualia that she associates with
‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’. And he will construe her verdicts on the
ascription of ‘gold’ as based on her verdicts on the presence of
these qualia. But this construal seems to rule out the kind of
revision that we have described.32
In order to see how the nominalist could try to accommodate
these revisions, we need to consider in some detail the kind of
circumstances in which they would come about. Jane could come
32. Notice that the problem can’t be removed by invoking the social dimension of
language, and explaining satisfaction conditions in terms of the predicate–qualia pair-
ings adopted by the experts. For experts, like other speakers, treat their ascription
verdicts as open to revision.
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to the conclusion that she was wrong in ascribing ‘gold’ to
objects to which she was right in ascribing ‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’
if, e.g., she learnt chemistry. As a result of her chemistry training,
we would expect her to adopt new procedures for ascribing
‘gold’, e.g., using a spectroscope, and to treat the deliverances of
these procedures as overriding any conflicting verdicts that she
may have reached by other means. This change of procedures
could lead to the kind of revision that we are considering, as Jane
may have ascribed ‘gold’ to objects to which she feels inclined to
ascribe ‘yellow’ and ‘shiny’, but which fail the spectroscope test.
Notice that the nominalist would characterise this change of
procedures for the ascription of ‘gold’ as a change in its empirical
base. When Jane adopts the spectroscope test for the ascription
of ‘gold’, she replaces the empirical base that she had originally
assigned to the predicate with a new one—consisting of the col-
lection of qualia from whose presence she concludes that a spec-
troscope displays the spectrum that she has been taught to
associate with ‘gold’. And Jane’s revision of her verdicts on the
ascription of ‘gold’ is a consequence of this change in the empiri-
cal base that she assigns to the predicate.
This suggests that the nominalist could try to explain the revis-
ability of ascription verdicts as resulting from the fact that the
practice allows for the possibility of changes in the empirical base
of a predicate which don’t bring about changes in its satisfaction
conditions. We can change a verdict on the ascription of an
empirical predicate without changing the verdict concerning its
empirical base which led to the ascription verdict because that
empirical base may come to be replaced by another—without
this replacement changing the satisfaction conditions of the
predicate. The practice treats ascription verdicts as revisable, the
nominalist would contend, not because they are not based on
qualia apprehension, but because changes in the collection of
qualia that we associate with an empirical predicate are often
treated as leaving its satisfaction conditions unchanged.33
Let’s move on now to the possibility that a speaker inadver-
tently changes the satisfaction conditions that his understanding
33. A similar strategy could be adopted for dealing with the interpersonal analogue
of this situation. The nominalist empiricist doesn’t have to commit himself to the
claim that if the qualia that two speakers associate with a predicate lead them to
different verdicts on its ascription, the predicate has different satisfaction conditions
as meant by each of them.
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assigns to an empirical predicate. The practice seems to acknowl-
edge the possibility that such changes take place when speakers
change the procedures that they employ for deciding on the
ascription of an empirical predicate. Even if a speaker thinks that
a change of procedures will leave the satisfaction conditions of an
empirical predicate unchanged, the practice leaves the possibility
open of drawing the opposite conclusion. I want to suggest that
the nominalist could try to explain this feature of the practice by
looking at the procedures that we employ for deciding when a
change in the empirical base of an empirical predicate brings
about a change in its satisfaction conditions. The nominalist
could point out that these procedures do not require taking the
speaker’s original impression at face value. New information
could become available after the change that would recommend
overriding the speaker’s initial verdict. Revisions could also be
undertaken even in the absence of new information. For the pro-
cedures that we use for deciding these questions, the nominalist
could argue, are as revisable as the procedures that we employ
for deciding on the ascription of empirical predicates. In fact, the
former can be seen as a special case of the latter. For ‘...has
the same satisfaction conditions as ...’ is just a binary empirical
predicate, and changes in its empirical base need not bring about
changes in its satisfaction conditions.
Let’s consider finally the possibility, which the practice seems
to acknowledge, that a speaker is wrong in thinking that he has
succeeded in assigning satisfaction conditions to an empirical
predicate. For the nominalist, this means that, even if a speaker
has paired an empirical predicate with a collection of qualia, his
understanding of the predicate may fail to assign satisfaction
conditions to it. Once again, the nominalist could try to explain
this feature of the practice as arising from the nature of the pro-
cedures that we employ for deciding whether a speaker has suc-
ceeded in bestowing satisfaction conditions on a predicate.
According to these procedures, the nominalist could point out,
the fact that I have paired a predicate with a collection of qualia
weighs heavily in favour of the claim that the predicate has
acquired satisfaction conditions. But these procedures also leave
room for exceptions—situations in which I have paired the predi-
cate with a collection of qualia but the right conclusion to draw
is that the predicate hasn’t received satisfaction conditions. We
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may come to realise that a predicate has to be treated in this way
by learning more about the situation, or as a result of changes in
the procedures for deciding whether a predicate has satisfaction
conditions. Once again, the revisability of these procedures can
be treated as a special case of the revisability of the procedures
that we employ for deciding on the ascription of empirical predi-
cates. ‘...has satisfaction conditions’ is an empirical predicate
whose empirical base can be changed without changing its satis-
faction conditions.
VII
Satisfaction. Notice that the challenges to the nominalist position
that we have considered in the preceding section follow a com-
mon pattern. The nominalist has been challenged to explain, with
the limited resources at his disposal, aspects of our practice of
ascribing empirical predicates. And in each case I have suggested
that the nominalist construal of empirical predication might be
able to accommodate these features of the practice. No doubt
other objections of this kind can be raised against nominalist
empiricism, i.e. by pointing out aspects of the practice of empiri-
cal predication that the nominalist construal might seem to have
trouble accommodating. And vindicating the nominalist account
would require showing that, contrary to what may seem, it has
the resources for characterising the practice as having all the fea-
tures that we consider essential to it.
But even if the nominalist could claim total success on this
front, his position might still raise a fundamental worry. One
could argue that there is an important difference between show-
ing, on the one hand, how speakers can use empirical predicates
as if there were an objective relation of satisfaction between
predicates and objects, and showing, on the other, that such an
objective relation actually underlies the practice. Nominalist
empiricism, the objection would go, might have the resources for
discharging the former task, but for the latter task universals
are indispensable. Nominalist empiricism could at best show that
universals are not needed for describing a practice involving
empirical predicates with the ‘grammatical’ features that it would
have if many of these predicates had objective satisfaction
conditions. But it lacks the resources for vindicating the meta-
physical reality that is supposed to underlie these grammatical
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appearances. This would require showing that there is a
relation that some empirical predicates bear to universals,
whose instantiation conditions determine the satisfaction con-
ditions of the predicates with which they are associated. I’d like
to end by considering how the nominalist could try to answer
this objection.
As we have seen, the nominalist doesn’t need to deny that
speakers who engage in the practice of empirical predication see
many of their predicates as having satisfaction conditions, since
they see the conscious episodes in which they pair empirical
predicates with collections of qualia as having this consequence.
Moreover, the nominalist characterisation of the practice sanc-
tions these verdicts as correct. They are subject to revision, since,
as we have seen, the speakers might come to the conclusion that,
in pairing an empirical predicate with a collection of qualia, they
have failed to endow it with satisfaction conditions. But revisable
as they may be, these verdicts are sanctioned by the rules of the
practice as the right thing to say, until speakers come across what
they would treat as grounds for revision.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the nominalist will be willing to
accommodate in his characterisation of the practice of empirical
predication the speakers’ impression that their verdicts on
whether a predicate has satisfaction conditions, on whether the
satisfaction conditions of a predicate have remained constant,
and on whether an object satisfies a predicate, are permanently
open to revision. And it would be reasonable to interpret this
impression as an implicit commitment to the objectivity of the
satisfaction conditions that speakers see their empirical predi-
cates as having. For it amounts to acknowledging that satisfac-
tion facts are not determined by the verdicts to which they feel
inclined.
In fact, if the question were raised, whether their empirical
predicates have objective satisfaction conditions, we could expect
speakers to make this commitment explicit by answering the
question in the affirmative. And in giving this answer they would
be faithful to the rules that govern the practice, on the nominalist
characterisation. Therefore, according to the nominalist, they
would be right in asserting the existence of an objective relation
of satisfaction linking their predicates with the world—even
though their verdicts on which of their empirical predicates enter
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into this objective relation, and on which objects each of these
predicates is related to, would have to be treated as permanently
provisional.
Hence the objection that we are considering could only be
pressed by invoking a distinction between the answer that the
question would receive ‘within the practice’, and the answer that
it ought to receive if it were raised ‘from outside’. The rules of
the practice that the nominalist has characterised may sanction
an affirmative answer, but whatever these rules dictate, the objec-
tion would go, our empirical predicates could actually fail to sus-
tain an objective relation of satisfaction with the objects in the
world. And this would be the situation unless there were a
relation linking empirical predicates to universals that determine
their satisfaction conditions.
Thus the objection presupposes a picture in which there is a
meaningful distinction between the practice of ascribing empiri-
cal predicates according to our inclinations and the level at which
questions of philosophical semantics are raised and adjudicated.
According to this picture, the philosopher would have to step
outside the practice and consider, from that external vantage
point, whether there really is the connection between language
and reality postulated by those who engage in the practice. I
want to suggest that the nominalist empiricist could answer the
objection by questioning this picture. He could insist that the
vantage point external to the practice from which the objection
would have to be raised is totally illusory.34 The semanticist is
on the same boat as his fellow speakers. He has to decide whether
to classify certain objects—our empirical predicates—as being of
a certain kind—as having objective satisfaction conditions. And
to make this decision he has to proceed in the same way as when
he is trying to decide, e.g., whether to classify a table-top as
square. He has to apply the procedures that he has adopted for
answering these questions, and endorse the answers to which he
feels inclined. His verdicts on empirical predicates, like his ver-
dicts on table-tops, will be subject to revision in light of further
experience, and of changes in the procedures on which they are
based. But it is hard to see how this characterisation of his task
34. I develop these ideas in ‘Realism Detranscendantalized’, European Journal of
Philosophy, 8 (2000), pp. 63–88.
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could be rejected on these grounds, as we should have been
suspicious all along of the philosopher’s aspiration to give to our
inclinations a level of certainty that seemed unattainable without
his help.
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